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Poison Pills and the European Case
JEFFREY N. GORDON
Professor Coates has given us a welcome opportunity to revisit the
question of shareholder rights plans, or poison pills. It is interesting to
evaluate a revisionist's view of an important empirical debate - but
less because of the role that empirical evidence may have played in the
evolution of U.S. corporate law doctrine and more because of the rele-
vance of that debate to a world, especially Europe, that is waking up to
the vigorous market in corporate control. If contested takeovers involv-
ing target firms such as Gucci, Telecom Italia, Paribas, and Mannesman
are headline grabbing events in 1999 and 2000, what follows next in the
moves towards European economic integration? What defensive mea-
sures, if any, should we encourage on the part of target management of
an European Union company faced with a hostile takeover bid?
To give away the punchline, I am critical of the implicit defense in
Professor Coates's paper of poison pills as they have evolved in U.S.
practice, finding that defense in the spirit if not in the words of his paper.
Instead, I think that a different evolutionary path that focuses on share-
holder choice in the formulation and use of poison pills might well be
possible and desirable for European corporate governance.
There is an implicit contradiction, I think, between two papers that
Professor Coates has discussed: The Contestability of Corporate Con-
trol: A Critique of the Scientific Evidence and An Index of the Contest-
ability of Corporate Control: Studying Variation in Legal Takeover
Vulnerability. In the second paper, Professor Coates shows how care-
fully constructed defensive measures, especially a pill as protected by a
classified board, stretch out the time period required for success in a
hostile bid. This realization affects planning both by a well-advised
potential target and by an acquiror in picking out a target. The intended
consequence of the defensive activity is a selection effect, built on the
view that an acquiror is more likely to go after more vulnerable targets
and will stay away from less vulnerable targets. I take it that Professor
Coates's ultimate objective in devising this Contestability Index is to
show its predictive power in precisely this way.
But - and this is key - there is no reason to think that the con-
testability of the target maps onto the quality of target management or its
fidelity to shareholder value. Effective pill-based defensive measures
will skew the selection of potential targets. A hostile bidder will act not
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where it perceives the greatest potential value-added, but, rather, the
greatest gains given the vulnerability of the target. So, if Professor
Coates is right in his Contestability Index paper, there is bound to be a
loss from this selection effect, an efficiency loss for shareholders over-
all. I take this conclusion to be at odds with the spirit of the first paper:
that pills are not a management entrenchment device but merely a mech-
anism to structure a rational bidding process.
I believe pills can and do serve that function, but, regrettably they
are overbroad - much overbroad - for that purpose. As one observes
how managements and their advisors have pushed such devices as dead-
hand pills and no hand pills,1 despite the clear inconsistency with norms
of shareholder governance, it strains credulity to think that shareholder
value has been the only management motive.'
I agree with Professor Coates that the empirical evidence on poison
pills is difficult to assess but would add an additional set of reasons.
What the "pill" is, as a strategic and tactical matter, has changed sub-
stantially since its first adoption. For example, in the 1986-89 period the
Delaware Chancery Court shaped the pill as a time-released remedy: it
gave management an opportunity to offer shareholders a transactional
alternative to a raider's bid but could not be maintained indefinitely so
as to prevent shareholders from accepting a noncoercive bid.3 The Dela-
ware Supreme Court changed the rules in 1990 in Paramount Communi-
cations, Inc. v. Time Inc.4 In practice, a board now has the power to
"just say no" to a hostile bid, subject to the shareholder prerogative of
replacing the board. The early 1990's saw two new developments: raid-
ers perfected the takeover methodology of coupling a hostile bid and
proxy contest, and managements loaded up on stock options. Both
changes reduce the defensive effects of a poison pill. So, early in the
period, the pill was a limited entrenchment device (albeit one that
invited potentially value-destroying restructuring), later in the period the
1. Both of these innovations were adopted to combat the bidder strategy of coupling a
hostile bid with a proxy contest to gain control of the board and thus the power to redeem the pill.
A deadhand pill purports to restrict the power to redeem the pill to continuing directors, i.e., those
directors nominated by the incumbeant management team. A no-hands pill (or delayed
redemption pill) restricts board power to redeem a pill at all for a time period following a change
in board control. The Delaware Supreme Court has rejected both of these measures as trenching
on the board's managerial authority. See Quicktum Design Systems, Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d
1281 (Del. 1998). Other courts have been more permissive. See Invacare Corp. v. Healthdyne
Tech., Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1578 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (applying Georgia law). See generally Jeffrey N.
Gordon, "Just Say Never?" Poison Pills, Deadhand Pills, and Shareholder-Adopted By-Laws: An
Essay for Warren Buffett, 19 CARozo L. REv. 511 (1997).
2. As Richard Pryor famously remarked about the denying spouse caught in flagrante
delicto: "Honey, who are you going to believe, me or your lying eyes?"
3. The leading case in City Capital Assoc. v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988).
4. 271 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990).
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pill was a strong entrenchment device (which reduced the incentive for
restructuring) and still later, the entrenchment effects somewhat declined
(without reviving the incentives to restructure). Empirical studies that
collapse these different effects into "the pill" are of limited value.
I certainly agree with Professor Coates that, as pills became com-
monplace so that all firms had one, actual or virtual, the announcement
of pill adoption was merely a signal - and often an ambiguous one -
of managerial intentions, rather than an event that changed the target's
vulnerability to takeover. Thus, the only pill studies that may conceiva-
bly shed light on the question of pills and shareholder value focus on the
early adoptions. Entirely apart from potential methodological objec-
tions, changes in the strategic and tactical effects of a pill, however,
render those studies of limited usefulness for guiding current policy.
The fact that pills have not stopped hostile bids in the United States
hardly answers the concerns. First, notice the change in bidders, who
have shifted from the control entrepreneurs of the 1980's to the deep
pocket companies of the 1990's. Only established companies can
finance and wait out the costly delay of a proxy contest needed to disarm
a pill, a credible threat of which is an important element for a hostile
acquisition. Yet, control entrepreneurs may supply a necessary correc-
tive to the empire-building tendencies that are common among
acquirors. Such was the role of at least some of the financial bidders of
the 1980's in disaggregating ungainly conglomerates. Second, firms
have instituted very expensive executive compensation systems to
encourage managers to yield to a hostile bid despite their having the
legal authority to resist. Recent empirical work suggests that executive
compensation is greater in the most protective states, such as Penn-
sylvania, and in firms otherwise protected, and that increased compensa-
tion is skewed to stock options.' Where firms build in enough
incentives, poison pills are no problem, but note that shareholders bear
the costs.
Let us turn to pills in the comparative U.S.-European context. The
poison pill solved three problems in the U.S. transactional arena. First,
the pill blocked procedurally or structurally unfair bidder tactics that
might deprive shareholders of their legitimate share of the merger sur-
plus, tactics such as the creeping tender offer, two-tier front-loaded bids,
partial bids and orchestrated purchases from a small group of institu-
5. See MARIANNE BERTRAND & SENHIL MULLAINATHAN, EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND
INCENTIVES: THE IMPACT OF TAKEOVER LEGISLATION (National Bureau of Econ. Research
Working Paper No. 6830, 1998); MICHAEL H. HAm AND ERIC NOWAK, EXECUTIVE
COMPENSATION AND THE SUSCEPTIBILITY OF FIRMS TO HOSTILE TAKEOVERS: AN EMPIRICAL
INVESTIGATION OF THE U.S. OIL INDUSTRY (Dep't. of Fin., Johann Wolfgang Goethe-University
Frankfurt Working Paper No. 32, 1999).
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tional investors.6 Second, in a world in which defensive measures were
permitted, the pill provided a lower-cost and less damaging alternative
to restructuring, stock buybacks, crown jewel asset sales, white squire
deals and various scorched earth tactics that preceded it. The goal of the
pill is like that of the neutron bomb: eliminate the hostile bidder but
leave the target assets unscathed.
Neither of these two functions is necessary for European merger
and acquisition practice, it appears. The European Union is on the verge
of adopting harmonized regulation of takeover practice on the United
Kingdom model, the so-called "Thirteenth Directive," 7 which will elimi-
nate many potentially troublesome bidder tactics. In particular, it would
substitute the requirement of a "mandatory bid" for the pill's protection
against creeping tender offers or partial bids. This means that a bidder
who acquires a specified minority interest sufficient for control will be
obliged to bid for the remainder of the stock at an "equitable price."8
For example, a mandatory bid provision would have blocked the recent
acquisition by LVMH of 36 percent of Gucci's stock.9 Similarly, the
proposed Thirteenth Directive would prohibit all non-shareholder-
approved post-bid defensive measures, which substitutes for the pill's
appeal as a non-destructive defensive measure.
Nevertheless, the pill has additional value in the United States that
could be translated to Europe. This is the value of a reasonable measure
delay. Although the market in corporate control, including hostile bids,
has been a significant element in U.S. economic success over the past
fifteen years, I believe that control markets potentially may create risks
both to shareholder value and to overall efficiency. In part, this is
6. See, e.g., Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd, 682 F.2d 355
(2d Cir. 1982), cert denied sub nom., Dickinson v. SEC, 460 U.S. 1069 (1983).
7. See "Amended Proposal for a 13th European Parliament and Council Directive on
Company Law Concerning Takeover Bids," 9428/99 DRS 18 CODEC 368 (Interinstitutional No.
95/0381) (Text of amended proposal as it stands after the meeting of the EU Council of
International Market Ministers on June 21, 1999) [hereinafter Thirteenth Directive]; European
Commission, Directorate General, "Proposed Takeovers Directive - Questions and Answers"
(Nov. 23, 1999) (located at <http://europa.eu.int/comm/intemal-market/en/company/company/
35.htmz>, visited June 6, 2000. Adoption of the 13th Directive was delayed by an unrelated
dispute between Great Britain and Spain over the status of Gilbrator that has now been resolved.
Concerns that the German government might want to negotiate the directive following the
December 1999 hostile takeover of Mannesmann have been allayed by recent government/
industry agreement on implementing domestic legislation. See Ralph Atkins, "Germans Agree on
Code to Govern Takeovers," FIN.T., May 18, 2000, at 10.
8. Thirteenth Directive, Art. 5 § 1. For contrasting analyses from an economic perspective,
compare Ulrich Hommel, Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: Lessons from Germany,
3 INr'L J. Bus. 100 (1998) with Clas Bergstrom, Peter Hogfeldt & John Molin, The Optimality of
the Mandatory Bid Rule, 13 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 433 (1997).
9. For an account of the LVMH stock purchase and the aftermath, see John G. Finley, The
Rise of the Hostile Bid in Continental Europe.
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because stock market volatility may open up possibilities for an arbi-
trage between stock markets and asset markets, through which market
participants may capture disproportionate amounts of the merger sur-
plus. Control markets that are too liquid can also interfere with human
capital investments of managers and employees and with other invest-
ment decisions. The pill puts absorptive rods in the corporate control
reactor, slowing down the pace of the conversions. ° The United States
has managed to luck into a shaky balance on this question, creating a
Goldilocks control market - not too hot, not too cold. Perhaps Dela-
ware courts get some credit as modulators, but, if so, certainly not by
explicit doctrinal design."
Europe may need to do something, but it can do better than the
United States by following the road not travelled here of shareholder
choice, a more reliable road. Early Delaware decisions that approved
the pill took shareholder choice out of the game in the United States. 2
Shareholder activists have attempted to reclaim this lost territory with
bylaw amendment proposals. Whether the Delaware court will permit
this is a disputed question. 3 If it is rational to build in delay, there is
every reason to believe that shareholders would be receptive to manag-
ers' arguments for a carefully designed ex ante measure that would
accomplish this. For example, some have wondered if the apparent dis-
parity in premia between transactions in Europe and in the United States
is attributable to the greater bargaining power that the pill gives target
management.14 (The 100 percent premium that Mannesmann extracted
from Vodafone AirTouch may lead to a revaluation of that view.) An
alternative explanation is that the premium disparity may arise from the
legal and cultural limitations on rapid cost-cutting associated with the
European social compact. This may reduce the value of European busi-
10. This is, in principle, an empirically testable proposition. In my view, the empirical
evidence on poison pills is largely irrelevant to the real issue: the shaping of a corporate control
market nested in a broader system of corporate governance that fosters economic development.
See generally, Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Shaping Force of Corporate Law in the New Economic
Order, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 1473 (1997).
11. But see Jeffrey N. Gordon, Corporations, Markets, and Courts, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1931
(1991) (ascribing the decision in Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140
(Del. 1990) to the Delaware Supreme Court's concern about potentially disruptive pace of
takeovers).
12. Moran v. Household Int'l, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985); Paramount Communications, Inc.
v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990).
13. Compare supra note I with Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Corporate Democracy and
Stockholder-adopted By-laws: Taking Back the Street? 73 TULANE L. REv. 409 (1998).
14. See Christian Kirchner & Richard Painter, A Modified Business Judgment Rule for
European Takeover Law (forthcoming 2000 in Die Aktiengesellschaft, in German translation;
English version on file with author) (discussing average premium data for European takeovers
from THE DAmv DEAL, Jan. 6, 2000) [hereinafter Kirchner & Painter].
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ness combinations and thus would predictably lead to lower premia. In
any event, shareholders are sufficiently well equipped to evaluate the
arguments on both sides of this question and take decisions about the
appropriate design of a pill-like device.
The U.S. experience with shareholder voting on poison pills sup-
ports the idea of shareholder rationality. On the few occasions that U.S.
companies have put poison pill proposals to shareholder vote, sharehold-
ers, including institutional investors, endorsed them. Such proposals
tend to be more limited in duration and type than the pills unilaterally
adopted by management.15 In targeting firms for pill rescission resolu-
tions, shareholder activists almost invariably pick firms that have egre-
giously underperformed the relevant industry index and institutional
investors vote accordingly.' 6 As sophisticated institutional investors in
Europe come to understand the potential problems of active control mar-
kets, they will cooperate with management to devise appropriate
solutions.
It may be that the European solution will vary significantly from
the U.S.-style poison pill because of the legal barriers erected by the
Thirteenth Directive itself. As a counterpoint to the mandatory bid, the
proposed Thirteenth Directive limits defensive action on the part of a
target board, very nearly a neutrality rule. Proposed Article 8 provides:
1. Member States shall ensure that rules are in force requiring that:
(a) at the latest after receiving [public notice of a bid] and until
the result of the bid is made public or the bid lapses, the board of
15. For example, shareholders approved pill proposals for Texaco in 1997 and for Horizon
Mental Health Management in 1998. See INVESTOR RESPONSIBILITY RESEARCH CENTER,
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SERVICE 1998 BACKGROUND REPORT E: POISON PILLS 2 (June 25,
1998).
16. Over the 1987-98 period, the annual average number of pill redemption proposals
(typically in advisory, rather than mandatory, form) was approximately twenty. These proposals
generally received votes of one third to a majority of shares. Shareholder activists almost
invariably target underperformers. In 1998, for example, all targeted firms underperformed the
S&P 500 index over a five-year period. Id. at 5. Even the Georgeson & Co. Study, which
endorses poison pills, concedes that "shareholder proposal proponents tend to target companies
with poor performance." GEORGESON & CO, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: INSTITUTIONAL VOTING
ON POISON PILL RESCISSION 4 (Nov. 1997).
There is debate over the sensitivity of institutional voting to relative performance among the
targeted firms, with some evidence offered by IRRC and Georgeson that institutions follow
guidelines in casting their votes rather than focusing on the very worst performers. This is a weak
attack on the rationality of institutional voting, however, since by hypothesis all the firms on the
targeted list are significant underperformers. Moreover, according to Georgeson, the
determinative factor of the percentage vote is the composition of the shareholder body: activist
institutions such as Fidelity and Wellington take an aggressive approach to proxy issues; other
institutions are more passive. Id. at 2-4. This will, of course, disturb any correlation between
votes for the proposal and the firm's performance, but it hardly makes out the case that Fidelity
and Wellington are themselves irrational in casting votes in the proxy process.
[Vol. 54:839
POISON PILLS AND THE EUROPEAN CASE
the offeree company should abstain from any action other than
seeking alternative bids which may result in frustration of the
offer, and notably from the issuing of shares which may result in
a lasting impediment to the offeror to obtain control over the
offeree company, unless it has the prior authorization of the gen-
eral meeting of the shareholders given for this purpose, during
the period of the acceptance of the bid.
2. Member states may allow the board of the offeree company to
increase the share capital during the period for acceptance of the bid
on the condition that prior authorization has been received from the
general meeting of shareholders not earlier than 18 months before the
beginning of the period of acceptance of the bid, with full recognition
of the rights of preemption of all shareholders as provided for [in a
prior directive].
This appears to erect two barriers to use of a U.S.-style poison pill:
first, the need to obtain shareholder approval for any defensive measures
during the pendency of the bid, and second, preemptive rights protec-
tion. Conceivably pre-bid approval of a mechanism that operated
mechanically following a bid would solve the first problem, or techno-
logical advances in shareholder voting (e.g., use of the Internet) would
permit post-bid approval. t7 Preemptive rights are a tougher problem,
because the U.S.-style pill operates on the basis of a discriminatory
share issuance that would penalize an unwanted acquiror. Nevertheless
the way is open to creative minds to devise solutions that will fit both
the constraints of the Thirteenth Directive and the objectives of
shareholders. ' I
I offer as evidence a Wachtell Lipton Rosen & Katz client memo of
February 4, 2000, in which a lawyer famous for his creative efforts with
poison pills now proposes for Europe a mechanism by which a target
facing a hostile bid commits itself to an auction if, within a specified
period of time, its stock price does not exceed 125% of a hostile bidder's
17. See Kirchner & Painter, supra note 14, at 37.
18. Concededly, shareholder-choice mechanisms are unlikely to attend to the interests of
other stakeholders. The U.S. experience with constituency statutes argues that those interests are
best addressed outside the realm of corporate governance. In the face of a hostile bid U.S.
managers have generally used this statutory power to balance interests of shareholders and
stakeholders either to extract a higher price for shareholders or a better deal for themselves, but
rarely to protect stakeholders such as employees. At best, this managerial discretion gives
random, not systematic, protection to these interests, which, if important, deserve more reliable
protection. Arguably the European corporate governance starting point, which admits of more
"co-determination," literally or figuratively, would produce such systematic management attention
to stakeholder interest in a takeover. This is part of Kirchner & Painter's rationale for a "modified
business judgment rule for European takeover law." Any such a standard of managerial discretion
would present difficult problems of judicial manageability and is likely in the near term to
function like U.S.-style constituency statutes, i.e., poorly.
2000]
846 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:839
offer. This plan, and many others, build on shareholder choice - but
not the U.S.-brand pill - may be a useful ingredient for the European
takeover market.
